A group of military and civilian personnel stands in front of a building with international flags and a model of a fighter plane.
Members of a 3-day working group in support of Operation Olympic Defender stand together outside of U.S. Space Forces - Space headquarters on Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., Nov. 6, 2024. (Source: U.S. Space Force)

More than five years ago, in April of 2019, Gen. John Hyten, the then Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, announced that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) would be sharing its space war plans with allied nations for the first time as part of a new operation known as Olympic Defender. The following year, the former commander of U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations, Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, signed the USSPACECOM order to take control of Operation Olympic Defender from STRATCOM.

At the time, Gen. Raymond said that, “The establishment of a multinational effort focused on space reflects the value of space contributions to national security, the evolution of threats to U.S. space systems, and the importance of deterring potential adversaries from attacking critical U.S. space systems.”

However, in the years following that announcement, news and information about Olympic Defender slowed, and little was said about the operation, even as adversaries demonstrated their capabilities to degrade and deny satellites and satellite communications. That is, until this past fall, when numerous new nations, including Germany, France and New Zealand, accepted invitations to join.

According to Frank Rose, who served as the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Biden administration, Olympic Defender is another in a long list of actions that the U.S. government has taken to increase coordination and collaboration with allies in direct response to increased threats in space.

“When I was both Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy and then eventually Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, we began a series of space security dialogs to include the State Department and DoD with countries like Japan, France, Germany, India and the United Arab Emirates,” said Rose. “Why? Because we recognized that to operate in this increasingly contested domain, leveraging allied capabilities would need to be a key part of our strategy.”

Ultimately, Operation Olympic Defender will align numerous allies together to help defend satellites and satellite capabilities in an increasingly contested space domain. A sentiment shared by a spokesperson for the French Space Command, who said, “Potential threats [have] become [increasingly] numerous, and demonstrations of their uses have become more frequent. [France joined Operation Olympic Defender] as a way to address the challenge of preserving the space domain and national interests of like-minded nations.”

But what, exactly, does Operation Olympic Defender involve? How will the included nations – including the “Five Eyes” nations, France, and Germany – work together to increase the safety of satellites and space capabilities?

Olympic Defender and SSA

Each year, the Secure World Foundation releases its Global Counterspace Capabilities Report, which “…assesses the current and near-term future [antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities] for each country, along with their potential military utility.” This report highlights the ASAT potential of twelve countries: U.S., Russia, China, India, Australia, France, Japan, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea and the United Kingdom.

According to the Secure World Foundation’s report, the list of ASAT capabilities extends well beyond direct kinetic attacks of satellites to include malicious Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) that can be conducted to degrade or damage spacecraft. This is a capability possessed by the largest adversaries of the “Five Eyes” nations – an intelligence alliance comprised of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

“Since 2010, Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could lead to or support a co-orbital ASAT capability, and some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program,” the report finds. “China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability.”

With two increasingly capable, near-peer adversaries capable of launching RPO attacks on allied satellites, the need for defense is apparent – and so is the need for space situational awareness (SSA) data. “Space situational awareness is foundational to everything you do in outer space from a military perspective,” said Rose. “If you don’t know what is up there, it is very hard to make good decisions.”

Operation Olympic Defender could be the key to ensuring that all involved nations have that situational awareness and can make those good decisions – especially considering the ASAT capabilities of modern, sophisticated adversaries.

“Operation Olympic Defender is mostly about sharing information for SSA capabilities to be able to monitor Earth’s orbits and see if there are any threats or actions that could be considered concerning,” explained Victoria Samson, the Chief Director for Space Security and Stability at the Secure World Foundation. “This speaks to the discomfort the U.S. and other countries have with uncoordinated close approaches and RPO operations done by other countries to their satellites.”

Since RPO operations are being conducted in orbit with little evidence or indication back on Earth, SSA is essential for anticipating and identifying these activities to defend satellites or plan contingencies should they become degraded or denied. Operation Olympic Defender could open the door to a better, shared operational picture of space for its member nations.

“…allies and partners of the U.S. are trying to figure out how they share space monitoring data and get a common understanding of the operational picture,” Samson said. “Operation Olympic Defender enables these nations to practice sharing [SSA data] across different classification levels, different technical formats, and even different units of measurement. It’s more about gearing up as opposed to conducting actual warfare.”

“Participating nations have complementary sensors, [making] national contributions to a common space [operating] picture a natural step for cooperation in space,” the French Space Command spokesperson agreed. “…cooperation through space domain awareness is a must-have.”

According to Rose, the close allied relationships enjoyed by the countries involved in Operation Olympic Defender are a key strategic advantage over their largest adversaries. “…the U.S. system of alliances and partnerships is one of the asymmetric advantages that we have in this era of strategic competition with countries like Russia and China,” explained Rose. “The Russians and the Chinese don’t have this system of alliances…”

Operation Olympic Defender is a way to leverage that strategic advantage by aggregating the combined SSA data of numerous allies with complementary sensors, analyzing it and identifying actionable insights from it. However, not all of the SSA data traditionally leveraged by these allied nations is generated by government systems and capabilities.

An Australian Air Force uniform sleeve with patches, including one featuring the Australian flag and the words 'Air Force.' The background is blurred, with people in a meeting setting.
A member from the Australian Space Operations Centre listens to discussions during a 3-day working group in support of Operation Olympic Defender at U.S. Space Forces – Space headquarters on Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., Nov. 4, 2024. (Source: U.S. Space Force)

How Industry Fits into the Olympic Defender Puzzle

As Gen. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, told attendees at the Mitchell Institute’s Space Security Forum, “You can never have too much space domain awareness. The demand for intelligence is continuous; it’s ever-changing.”

To meet this demand, the DoD and many of its coalition allies leverage SSA data from industry partners. In fact, according to a report by market research firm, Quilty Space, “In the coming years, DoD, and soon the Office of Space Commerce, are anticipated to spend tens of millions of dollars on commercial SSA data buy.”

With the aggregation and sharing of SSA data, which is such an integral part of Operation Olympic Defender, there are questions as to what – if any – role industry partners will play in this new multinational operation. While industry partners are not currently a part of Olympic Defender, Samson believes they will eventually have a seat at the table.

“I would imagine, at some point, they will bring in the commercial sector just because they have such strong SSA capabilities that are, at times, as good or even better [than] government SSA capabilities,” Samson said. “I think that, eventually, they’re going to want to bring in at least a few of the SSA operators because they have [capabilities that would be] beneficial to getting a better overall picture of what’s happening within the space domain.”

According to the French Space Command representative, commercial partners play an important role in meeting the SSA requirements of many Olympic Defender nations, which could lead to their eventual inclusion.

“France builds its SSA first on its legacy capabilities and then by aggregating commercial capabilities that complement them. This approach of complementing SSA capabilities by leveraging commercial capabilities is common to most nations, even the best equipped,” they explained. “Consequently, it seems logical that commercial partners will play a role in Operation Olympic Defender space domain awareness, within the limits permitted by the classification level...”

Samson agreed that classification levels and security concerns could be among the largest challenges to bringing industry partners to the table. However, she claimed these problems have been overcome before, when attempting to incorporate industry partners into military training exercises and organizations.

“Something like a tiered system, like what exists for the Schriever War Games, [could be implemented.] They did not start off with the commercial sector involved. They came in later,” explained Samson. “I can envision Operation Olympic Defender going the same way - starting with the U.S. and the ‘Five Eyes,’ and expanding out a little bit to bring in more trusted partners, and then eventually bringing in a few commercial partners.”

Regardless of when – or if – industry partners eventually play a role in Operation Olympic Defender, its ability to increase information sharing and deliver a better, more detailed operating picture of the space domain for its member nations could be invaluable. As the French Space Command spokesperson explained, “Operation Olympic Defender will enable the first combined military space operations to ensure safe, secure and sustainable access to space, and the assurance of being able to rely on our space assets.”

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