Background: A Chaotic Time in Space

With the normalization of pan-global internet access and social media, Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) has become an increasingly important piece of the worldwide intelligence puzzle. As defined in the 2024-2026 Intelligence Community OSINT Strategy, OSINT is intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. Yet, OSINT is more than just commercially or publicly available information. The power of OSINT isn’t merely access to publicly available information, it is the ability of analysts to make timely, relevant and reliable conclusions that end users can leverage when making tactical decisions. Applying data science, artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML), and content authentication tools, OSINT analysts use rigorous analytical tradecraft to make sense of the noise.

OSINT is a key component of a complete intelligence picture, providing scalable visibility and crowd-sourced verification that are critical in a time where the volume of data is multiplying at breakneck speed and AI is approaching the quantum-enabled threshold.

The Value of Space-Based OSINT

According to a World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report, there are now more than 11,000 satellites in space, and that number is expected to increase by 800% by the end of the decade, according to a BBC News report. Satellites are being launched more frequently and at higher orbits, exacerbating congestion and debris. More players have entered the field–including diverse nation states and a wide-array of commercial entities. Furthermore, a once-peaceful research environment has now become an openly contested warfighting domain. From an intelligence perspective, it is a chaotic time.

Space-based OSINT, or intelligence from publicly or commercially available data collected from space, is already in play. It includes analytic judgments from satellite-derived ground imagery, signals intelligence collected from space-based sensors and space-to-space imagery. Some of the most poignant recent examples come from monitoring the conflict in Ukraine. OSINT, particularly that relying upon commercial satellite imagery has been invaluable in verifying military movements, tracking weaponry usage, identifying potential war crimes, and documenting damage to civilian infrastructure throughout the conflict. Moreover, OSINT has provided timely intelligence and key insights to partners during the conflict that would previously have been difficult to obtain due to limited access and classification barriers. As a result, OSINT changed the trajectory of that war and is widely expected be a permanent feature of future conflicts.

Publicly available geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT, is a critical source of information for the OSINT community to draw upon but should not be confused with OSINT. It is only when an OSINT analyst applies their tradecraft to GEOINT in conjunction with other available sources of intelligence to develop a mature assessment that it becomes OSINT.

And OSINT isn’t limited to gathering intelligence about our Earth from above. Space-focused OSINT, or intelligence gleaned from publicly or commercially available data that focuses exclusively on what is happening in space, is rapidly developing. Dr. Alexis Truitt, a Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA), highlighted the need for space situational awareness as it relates to space debris in a Guidehouse interview earlier this year. “There are over 100 million pieces of debris greater than 1mm in size… according to National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Office of the Inspector General report on debris risk,” he cited, “less than 1 percent of debris that can cause mission-ending damage are currently tracked.” IARPA, NASA, and the European Space Agency (ESA) have invested heavily in the detection, tracking and characterization of orbital space debris to advance space safety. Similarly, entities like CelesTrak and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) publish data monitoring satellite movements, deconstructing orbits, and predicting potential collisions. These are critical sources of data that feed OSINT analysis, enabling trained analysts to provide critical space domain awareness.

In instances, when OSINT may not be available, appropriate, or legally feasible, Publicly Available Information Research (PAIR) has been employed. A prime example of PAIR usage comes from the U.S. Space Force Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) cell, which provides diverse, timely, non-classified space domain awareness and alerting services to the U.S. space community and that of 18+ allied/partner nations. The JCO fuses civil, military, academic, commercial and contractor teams to research and report on patterns of life for satellites, launch systems, launch schedules and current events in support a wide array of civil, military and multinational missions. These teams monitor various open-source internet channels to gather key information (including public perception) about resident space objects, launch, nation-state and commercial activity. They also monitor space weather forecasts and communicate outages which may affect collection operations by friendly or adversary nations.

Using this information, PAIR teams are sometimes the first to identify possible indicators of satellite launches of interest, including launch support ship locations. PAIR also has the capability to monitor the publishing of airspace or oceanic closure related to orbital launches such as Notices to Air Missions, informing the space community about potential launches, event impacts, and public perception of events. According to Lt. Col. Mark Natale, JCO-NSDC, “PAIR differs in form, function, authorities, legalities, and execution from OSINT and is drastically different, but it can fill the gaps where OSINT may fall short.”

Growing Recognition and Need

Practitioners cite a growing need to identify and assess spaced-based activity as great power competition intensifies. The seminal 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test demonstrated the cascading destructive effect of such operations in space. This triggered some experts to express concern about Kessler Syndrome, or the scenario where space becomes unusable because of the severity of collision impacts in a crowded low- Earth orbit. But the cautionary tale did not prevent future anti-satellite testing. Russia has since performed a similarly destructive anti-satellite test in 2021 and is now indicating it may step back from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, leading many to worry that they intend to launch nuclear weapons in space. It is clear, we have entered a high-stakes contest.

OSINT analysts can support the space warfighter by providing critical space domain assessments, including but not limited to what constitutes normal, avoidant, and aggressive space maneuvers. OSINT analysts can also leverage commercially and publicly available radio frequency signals monitoring to report on satellite positioning, communication, and movement. Furthermore, they can use RF detection and geolocation as indicators of electronic warfare. Lastly, OSINT can help the national security apparatus track the increasing number and diversity of satellites that are being launched into higher and non-traditional orbits.

Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 is a set of analytic tradecraft standards that govern the production and evaluation of intelligence products across the intelligence community. The standards apply to the OSINT lifecycle, however, as was expertly quoted in a Rand study focused on optimizing OSINT, “we [still] don’t treat the collection and production of OSINT as a separate discipline. As long as the IC OSINT effort is a modest OSE and a bunch of cottage industries scattered around the IC, we’ll never bring OSINT into play in a way commensurate to its value in all-source assessment.”

Normalizing OSINT as a critical ingredient of space domain awareness requires that we acknowledge it; integrate it; and prioritize it. That means first recognizing the unique value OSINT brings during a time in which technology is outpacing the human processes and structures that support it and there is exponential commercial growth in the space industry. Finally, prioritize maturation of space domain OSINT by creating a career track for it and dedicating offices and resources to perform it.

About the Authors:

Megan Moloney is an Associate Director with the Defense and Security Segment at Guidehouse. She has 20+ years of legal, investigation, intelligence, risk, and strategy experience. She is actively engaged in numerous professional organizations, to include co-leading the Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group for the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Space ISAC) and serving on the Board of Advisors for Iron Butterfly Media and CyberSat.

Melisa Stivaletti is the Director for Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) at Guidehouse and a recognized OSINT leader across the US Intelligence Community. She is the chair of the Emerging Professionals in the Intelligence Community (EPIC) Committee of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA).

Katie Parks